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Pursuit to the Seine
The Essex Scottish Regintent and the
Foret de Ia Londe, August 1944
Doug W. Mcintyre
he II Canadian Corps was to plan for an
opposed crossing of the Seine River between
Pont de l'Arche and Elbeuf and subsequently to
secure additional bridgeheads both above and
below Rouen on opportunity. On the left of the
2nd Canadian Infantry Division axis of advance
was the 7th British Armoured Division on a
roughly parallel line of advance. On our right
the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division would be
driving directly for Elbeuf and to their right, the
4th Canadian Armoured Division was aimed at
Pont de I'Arche a few miles east of Elbeuf.

T

On 21 August, the Essex Scottish left Point
152, a northern pivot or shoulder position of
the Falaise Gap, at the head of the 4th Brigade
leading the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division. We,
the battalion, formed up in the routine "advance
to contact" (ATC) formation directed to
Bourgtheroulde, a town on the sou them fringes
of Foret de la Lon de, just short of Elbeuf on the
Seine River. The roster of command that day for
the Essex Scots was as follows:
Commanding Officer- Lieutenant-Colonel Peter
W. Bennett
Second-in-Command- Major Tom Brown
Officer Commanding (OC) Support CompanyCaptain Doug W. MclntyTe
OC "A'' Company- Captain Tom C. Stewart
OC "B" Company- Major Haughton Laird
OC ··c Company- Major Tim McCoy
OC "D" Company- Major Telford Steele

All sub-unit commanders were commanding
badly-depleted companies, platoons & sections
following the maulings of the Caen and Falaise
fighting of the previous weeks ... and no

replacement personnel were forthcoming for this
operation.
At this point in time, still in sight of the
smouldering town of Falaise, we were less than
50 miles (as-the-crow-flies) from the Elbeuf/
Rouen loop or peninsula in the Seine River. As
we shall see, we did not reach the outskirts of
Elbeuf until six days later or after midnight on
the night of 26 I 27 August. Of course, the actual
true miles traversed on narrow, congested and
cratered roads with make-shift bridges could
have been upwards of 100 miles. But, as
explained briefly below, this was the only way to
travel.
The ATC formation, a manoeuvre wellrehearsed by all survivors of exercises in
England, was the accepted procedure for reengaging or catching up to a flown enemy. While
somewhat precarious for the "point" sections and
platoons of the leading company strung out in
single file on alternate sides of the axis road,
companies and battalions could be rotated by
simple leapfrogging within the marching column.
Not even the most duty-bound infantry soldiers
relished the idea of acting as "bait" stuck out in
front of a divisional column on strange terrain
and unknown countryside to draw enemy fire
whenever and from wherever it might come. Most
though took personal pride in being trusted with
the point "honours." The pace or rate of
movement in such a formation was that of the
leading section of six or seven men on their "flat
feet," so one can estimate an average of say three
miles per hour with no road obstructions or
enemy harassment. This rate placed a severe
strain on the dozens of tracked fighting vehicles
of the supporting weapons moving along in the
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Officers of the Essex Scottish Regiment, England, June 1944.
Front row. (left to right): J.S. MacLennan, J. Burgess, D. Mackenzie, F.A. Wansbrough, T.S. Jones, J.S.
MacDonald. F.A. Tilston. VC, H. W.P. Thompson. H. C. Laird, A.R. Johnson. Hayes; Second row: Craw. T.
Stewart. McCrimmon. ?, D. W. Mcintyre, J. Cardy, J.A. Baxter, T.E. Steele, J.C. Cottrell. E.L. Cohen. G.A.
Ponsford; Third row: Webster, F.J. Lynch. ?, MacDonald, Chander, ?. B. Mackenzie, Martin, W. Hogan. L.S.
Bond; Back row: Pofre. J. Cropp. Morgan, Genereau, Watt, F. Chauvin, Hodges, W.C. Wilson, Waddon.
(Photo courtesy qfTE. "Si"" Steele)

immediate rear of the marching infantry troops.
Innovation, in the long run, did more to ease
this problem than the "training manual."
Fortunately for the Essex Scots, as the lead
battalion of the 2nd Division's initial ATC
operation in Northwest Europe, we had until
mid-afternoon to get our supporting weapons
vehicles act in order. As Support Company
Commander, I started off in the morning with
my entire 40 or 50 tracked and wheeled
machines "hugging" the tail of the fourth
company's last section on the march. Naturally,
my jeep was never out of low gear, but at least I
was in the CO's favoured position to direct rapid
movement forward if and when the lead
company's "bait" encountered the enemy and
needed help.
However, before noon that morning the
General Staff Officer (G-1) of 2nd Division
appeared on the scene and directed me to adopt
the other procedure of pulling my vehicles into
"harbour" at 20 minutes to every hour (using
some convenient field as a parking lot). I
protested that as forward battalion my CO
wanted us as close as possible to his advancing
companies. The G-1 assured me he would
instruct his Military Police (MPs) to give our

convoys priority on the road for the other 40
minutes of the hour. He went on to direct that
because of congestion and sloppy traffic
discipline, the Division Commander had made
the vehicle "harbour" procedure an order. .. and
that was that. There was pandemonium on all
roads from then on. Brigade and Division staff
officers seemed to appear in both directions,
evidently on their own private reconnaissance
missions and asking why my regiment was
"dragging its feet." (Actually, we had few if any
stops until hitting the enemy ... not even for a tea
break). Also MPs were charging back and forth
on Nortons (motorbikes) and some did not know
what to give priority to. In any event, by early
afternoon, I pulled out with my jeep, two 6pounder anti-tank guns and two double armed
carriers to join the tail of our marching
companies permanently, leaving the bulk of the
support vehicles to perform the "harbouring"
game. An extra radio system was on so we had
constant control over the call for more support
gear as required.
During all of this jockeying for position in
the rear of the marching column during the
morning and early afternoon of 21 August, the
Essex Scots had passed uneventfully through the
towns of Damblainville, Barou and Ammeville.
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Approaching the village of Tortisambert, a few
miles east of Ammeville, the enemy finally
showed its ugly fangs. The lead company was
fired on by machine guns (MGs) and some
heavier calibre weapons (thought initially to be
a tank) in an improvised road block astride the
road into Tortisambert.
We had arrived at the most crucial instant of
the ATC battle. Rather a distinction for the Essex
Scots to be the first to "draw enemy blood" in
the 2nd Division's Pursuit to the Seine operation.
A more notable achievement now would call for
a quick and accurate appreciation of the
situation and execution of a counteraction to
overcome the enemy and to continue the advance
with a minimum loss to the momentum in the
Division's push to the Seine.
It was a place for cool, calculated decisionmaking. The lead company commander, in
contact with the CO, launched an immediate
flanking movement with two platoons and heavy
MG fire support from the third platoon,
supplemented by point-blank firing of the two
6-pounder anti-tank guns which I had sent up
the last few hundred yards to the front of the
column with the enemy's first blast ofMG fire. A
second company was committed within a short
time on the other flank enroute into Tortisambert
to back the lead company and to assure a full

consolidation of the German obstacle. The use
of our own 3-inch mortars (and Division artillery)
was not required with the likelihood that our
assaulting infantry would rapidly overcome their
objective. This result was achieved after a little
time in early darkness to mop up and completely
exploit further in the town to ensure clear
passage for the remainder of the battalion and
the brigade following up. Any "fire fight" of this
nature, even the most minor, has its vicious
moments. While the CO, with the lead company
commander, made the correct appreciation of
the enemy's position without over-reacting and
perhaps throwing in greater strength involving
costly time and casualties, the Essex Scots did
not get off completely unscathed. Private Donald
R. Smith died in the assault and a promising
young corporal, James A. Gatschene, died of
wounds the next day. Picking up our pieces, after
the Tortisambert delay of several hours, we
pushed on toward our planned bound for the
day, Livarot, a town liberated by the 7th British
Armoured Division on 20 August, and reached
it about 0400 hours for a few hours of much
needed sleep and a hot meal.
Despite the presence of the 7th British
Armoured Division in the vicinity, our continued
moves on 22 August yielded numerous and
conflicting reports from civilians of retreating
enemy groups, some with tanks, and most in a
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A photograph of the author, Doug W. Mcintrye, taken
just prior to D-Day in Folkestone. England. It was
sent home to his wife, Rosemary, with the
inscription, "With Love Darling, Doug."
(Photo courtesy

qf Mclntyre.family)

beautiful hills around us, if somewhat deadly
hills as we soon found out. It was the perfect
setting for a relaxing picnic if one could be
romantic enough to conjure up such visions
under happier times. There wasn't much rest as
the regiment became involved in an "on-againoff-again" shooting match with the much-feared
German 88's, rifle and MG fire. Before we moved
off the following day, we buried two young
privates, Kenneth W. Bolitho and Richard J.
Parent.

state of complete confusion. The few German
prisoners, rounded up from time to time had
lost contact with their main units and could not
provide any viable information as to locations,
directions or strengths.
The passage through the villages of Notre
Dame de Courson, les Aumais, Cernay and la
Cressonnie on 22 August were uneventful but
most gratifying. Every French citizen in the
towns, young and old, turned out to cheer on
their liberators. They presented or threw flowers,
offered apples, bread and that "forbidden
beverage" Calvados or other home-brews. (It was
an offence in II Canadian Corps if officers allowed
troops within their unit to consume the stuff.)
Nothing was more rewarding to all of us, even
VE- Day itself, than this heart-warming reception.
It alone made our journey worthwhile!
On 23 August, 4th Brigade stopped at la
Chappelle Yvon to take up a defensive position
on a reverse slope for what might be "that pause
that refreshes," certainly long enough hopefully
to get my dozens of drivers out of their rattling
tracked carriers. It was a mild, calm day with

On 24 August, we were blessed with the
arrival in our bailiwick of a fleet of troop-carrying
vehicles (TCVs), a luxury to an infantry division
of that era, but common to the infantry element
of an armoured division. At least those troops
not performing the lead role could rest their feet
with dry socks. The 24 and 25 August took us
through cheering throngs of villagers in
Courbonne-la-Ville, Cordebugle, Thiberville,
Duranville, le Mesnil, Brione and Bosrobert-auxPoulets. With the exception of the odd stray shot
and the reappearance of German fighters over
Brione, the situation was quiet, perhaps too
quiet.
At 2000 hours on 26 August, the Essex Scots
were again leading 4th Brigade toward
Bourgtheroulde. We had not proceeded more
than a few miles when it became most apparent
from the sound effects that a stiff fight was going
on in the town between the enemy and our own
Royal Highland Regiment (Black Watch). How
they (the Black Watch) had arrived in
Bourgtheroulde ahead of 4th Brigade was a
mystery. However, they had fought off several
German counterattacks with fairly heavy (from
our observations) casualties on both sides. As
we moved into the built-up area caution was
required to avoid a conflict with the Black Watch
in early darkness. We then "ran a gauntlet of fire,"
mostly very heavy mortar bombardment in the
main intersections, with some artificial lighting.
A number of vehicles and buildings were on fire
which assisted our regimental MPs in hustling
the marching companies directly through the
town. One such MP became a recruit (later
permanently) in my Support Company HQ. The
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moment he parked his Harley, to run 20 feet to
the centre of an intersection to direct our
vehicles, his bike was hit by a mortar bomb and
blown into several pieces. That incident ended
his driving of a two-wheeled machine forever. At
the far end of Bourgtheroulde, we linked up with
the main body of the Black Watch and took up
defensive positions beyond them. But not for
long! Before my most able Anti-Tank Platoon
Commander, Lieutenant Jock McLennan, could
rush out his six 6-pounder guns to the company
positions, we received the order "prepare to move
on." We had been in and out of our intermediate
objective, Bourgtheroulde, in a matter of about
two hours, barely enough time to pick up our
four sad losses or patch up a number of
wounded. Privates Harold W. Gallant, Peter
Heckman, George L. Hill and Donald E. Price
had fought their last battle ... what little there was
to it on this particular evening.
Although records are incomplete, during that
two hour period, Major-General Charles Foulkes,
the commander of 2nd Division apparently
considered that 6th Brigade should clear the
Foret de la Lon de of such enemy that might still
be present, while 4th and 5th Brigades crossed
the Seine at Elbeuf with the brigades of 3rd
Canadian Infantry Division. The final decision
was made to attack the Foret on the morning of
27 August with 4th Brigade on the right and the
6th Brigade on the left. Specifically, this would
mean 4th Brigade entering the westem environs
ofElbeuf and proceeding north up the river road
toward Port du Gravier, just under the high
ground in the middle of the Foret de la Londe.
The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry (RHLI) would
now take over the lead followed by the Essex
Scots with the Royal Regiment of Canada (RRC)
in reserve. The two forward battalions were to
seize the high ground overlooking Port du
Gravier and the RRC was to pass through and
take up a position south of Grand Essart.
Obviously, Corps or Division intelligence
summaries could not have indicated a
strengthening this very day of the "high ground."
The German 559th Grenadier Regiment (or
elements thereof) of the 331 st German Infantry
Division had been reinforced by elements of the
German 6th Para Group. Unconfirmed reports
from enemy prisoners taken during the next few
days revealed that some of these reinforcements
had been flown to the Rouen vicinity on 25 I 26
August from Paris with the do-or-die intention

of preventing us from interfering with the
German escape activities at Rouen.
With the order-of-march established as
above, we moved off from the east side of
Bourgtheroulde behind the RHLI at about 2330
hours to reach the Elbeuf area and the river road
with no problems. For some miles as we marched
(no place forTCVs here), the high ground loomed
on our left and as we closed up with the Seine
River west of Elbeuf, the high ground became
sheer cliffs on the left with limited shoulder off
the road. It did not occur to me until too late
that this was a great spot to get ambushed, just
like in the old Hollywood westerns. As it
happened, we were ambushed and trapped in
the defile for almost three days.
As outlined above, our ATC function was to
force the enemy to divulge his whereabouts. At
Port du Gravier, whether by design or accident,
he played it very cunningly. At about 0200 hours
(this was now 27 August) the lead company of
the RHLI mistakenly took the left fork in the road
at Port du Gravier instead of continuing on up
the river. Some 500 yards up the road to the
north along the valley of the railway they found
the road was blocked. The Essex Scots became
the lead battalion, by tactical necessity rather
than by a brigade order, by remaining on the
river road in the direction of Oissel and thence
Rouen. Reports differ, even among veterans of
that night, as to distances involved and the exact
timings of the events about to take place. As best
as we can surmise, Major Laird, "B" Company
Commander, and now the point company of 4th
Brigade, was challenged from the forested
heights to his left to, "Halt," (in good English) at
a point about 500 yards after passing through
the railway underpass at Port du Gravier. The
time was between 0330 and 0400 hours
Major Laird ignored the command, and
taking a conventional crash action response
ordered his platoons to take cover, what cover
there might have been on the right of the road
and the narrow meadows falling into the river
bank. They were immediately fired on by an
assortment of LMGs, MGs, mortars and
grenades. The following "A" Company under
Captain Stewart was still moving through the
eastern built-up end of the village but it was also
caught in the same blast of fire and it in turn
moved off to take cover along the left of road,
63
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Left: Port de Gravier looking south back along the road 4th Brigade used to approach the town. The
precariousness of the river road is apparent with the river on one side and sheers cliffs on the other. The
rail overpass at the centre of the photo marks the place where the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry missed a
turn in the road and walked into a road block. By necessity, the Essex Scottish assumed the lead and
shortly thereafter were attacked by the Germans. Right: The defile where the Support Company vehicles
were trapped and mortared just outside of Port du Gravier.
(Source: Essex Scottish Battalion History)

where more cover existed. Both commanders
reported by radio to Battalion HQ that the entire
river road was covered by fixed, probably rangedin fire, lines of fire and not likely manned by
some "hit and run" rearguard. The cunning
Jerries had effectively "let slip in" the best parts
of two infantry battalions, certainly into
temporary "dead-ends" (if aided by a simple map
reading error), and now if he possessed heavy
enough guns could "lock in our rear" by blocking
us with our own destroyed vehicles. This he
momentarily accomplished!
It shortly became apparent that the Germans
on the hills had ranged-in more than just the
village of Port du Gravier. The tail of the Essex
Scots, "C" and "D" Companies with Support
Company vehicles behind them, had still not
reached the village, when they were "hose-piped"
with light and medium mortar fire for perhaps a
l ,000 yards. Sitting in the river side of my jeep
with the demolished Port du Gravier railway
bridge barely visible in the darkness, the string
of bursting mortar shells could be seen
progressively approaching our position in the
middle of the road. A jeep is a sitting-duck target
any time and Bren gun carriers are a fairly
vulnerable target for direct hits from falling
bombs. My orders back along the column had a

few seconds to be heard- "dismount, forget your
gear, just small arms and radios ... take cover
along the cliffs on the left." Not all moved swiftly
enough. The bursting mortar bombs overtook
them! I will never know why my own jeep driver I
batman got under the jeep, instead of the safety
behind a wall just off the road, where Signals
Corporal "Chief' Thompson and I had between
us moved the heavy signals gear. It was too late
to save Private Harold R. Kalbfleisch, a 20-yearold boy from Kitchener, Ontario, from parents
of German extraction. The bomb detonated on
the thin steel floor in the back of the jeep thus
contributing to the force of the fragmentation.
The jeep immediately behind our Company HQ
jeep suffered a near-miss and caught two
occupants with shrapnel, one the Pioneer
Platoon Commander, Lieutenant Angus
McCrimmon, very seriously. The few dozen
vehicles further back in the column were spared
direct hits.
While Corporal Thompson was setting up
Support Company HQ in a cave at the base of
the cliff opposite our burning jeep remains, I
undertook to get the wounded up forward to our
Regimental Aid Post (RAP). We located Captain
Cliff Richardson, Battalion Medical Officer, and
his heroic stretcher bearers in a spacious cave a
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few hundred yards short of Port du Gravier. On
the way, I picked up another seriously wounded
acquaintance, Sergeant Walter Buszowski of"D"
Company, another victim of mortar shrapnel in
the eye. Unfortunately, Captain Richardson was
unable to save him. It is of note to mention at
this time, Captain Richardson had personally
driven his Red Cross van up and down the river
road, exposed to enemy fire, to pick up such
casualties as Sergeant Buszouski dying alone in
the darkness through loss of blood. Captain
Richardson, was awarded the Military Cross for
his actions.
Directed on to Battalion HQ from the RAP, I
arrived to be advised by the CO that Support
Company would have no role to play in the late
morning advance by the RRC and our own "C"
and "D" Companies
The CO had been alerted by 4th Brigade
Commander, Brigadier J.E. Ganong, that he had
ordered the reserve battalion to make a wide
flanking movement to the northwest, across the
Port du Gravier /Moulineaux road and get behind
the positions "Chalk Pits Hill" and "High Ground"
which were holding up the RHLI and the Essex
Scots.
The RRC advance got off about noon and
found slow going in the woods. Later in the
afternoon, the battalion ran into the Fusiliers
Mont-Royal (FMRs) advancing on the 6th Brigade
right flank. Still later in the day, the GOC 2nd
Infantry Division placed the FMRs under
command of the 4th Brigade. With this turn of
events, the RRC's plans were changed. They were
to abandon their attack across the road and
move northward to a rendezvous (RV) with "C"
and "D" Companies of the Essex Scots. Our "C"
and "D" Companies had been moved up from
below the village during the morning and were
now covering the battalion's left flank. These
companies ran into heavy mortar and MG fire
as they moved into the woods west and northwest
of the RHLI position. Direction and control were
difficult to maintain, particularly with the
harassment of enemy fire. In any event, the RV
was never established. The Essex Scots' War
Diary tends to blame the RRC for an "abortive
attack." We do not have the RRC War Diary before
us. The 4th Brigade Commander shed no more
light on the situation other than ordering units

involved back to the south for a new attack plan
as soon as it could be launched.
In the meantime, unlike all "the walks in the
woods" of 4th Brigade's left flank, heroic efforts
were being made all day on the far right flank,
all limited company or platoon sorties. "A" and
"B" Companies of the Essex Scots had to expand
their real estate holdings as held at first light on
the 27th. "A" Company, already in the shelter of
village buildings in the northeast sector of Port
du Gravier, formed and executed a plan of
moving up a steep building-lined sideroad or lane
to reach the base of the cliffs below "High
Ground," and thence to get up the heights in the
cover of small trees and perhaps neutralize part
of the enemy position. Little was gained and when
his leading platoon commander, Lieutenant Bill
Phoenix, was severely wounded along with other
casualties, Captain Stewart called off the assault.
With less than 30 all ranks remaining in "A"
Company, he hardly had sufficient manpower
remaining to reinforce success. "B" Company,
originally trapped along the river bank, gained
some ground during the morning on the left side
of the road and made the supreme sacrifice in
trying to exploit this by an assault up the south
slope of "High Ground." Early in the afternoon,
Major Laird directed Lieutenant Jim Coombe
with two reduced platoons in extended line to
make their way up the steep slope. If any officer
could get his men to the top, Jim Coombe was
that officer. Just about one month earlier, he had
held his ground against a robot tank attack at
Verrieres south of Caen and a few of his
"veterans" of that day where still with him.
However, the climbing assault bogged down as
the enemy fired ... or perhaps simply let gravity
move anything that would roll, every step of their
way up. Coombe was killed some distance from
the summit, and despite the spirited leadership
of several section leaders, the momentum was
lost.
Around midnight on 28 August, the
commander of 4th Brigade had left the GOC 2nd
Canadian Infantry Division with a new plan of
attack to begin as early as possible. (It is of note
that some of the units to engage in this
forthcoming attack had not had a hot meal for
18 hours or more). Briefly the plan was for the
RRC to continue their wide flanking movement
and outflank the MG and mortar positions

65

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1998

7

Canadian Military History, Vol. 7 [1998], Iss. 1, Art. 7

Foret de la Lon de ~',{i::v
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Above: Map showing Foret de la Lande. The railway lines running ]rom top to bottom (Moulineaux-Port du
Gravier) indicate the course oj a valley dividing the heights to the east and west. The dashed boxes
indicate the apporximate area shown by the air photos to the right.
Opposite: Air photos taken on 26 August 1944 (the day before the battle) showing the area contested by
4th Brigade. The bottom photo shows Port du Gravier, the bombed railway bridge, and the area known as
"High Ground." Visible just above the downed bridge is the railway overpass seen in the photo on page 64.
It is easy to see how in the darkness the RHLI missed the jork to the right to continue along the riveT: The
upper photo shows the areajust north oj Port du Gravier. The railway overpass in the lower l~{t comer oj
the photo marks the spot where the "C" and "D" Companies oj the Essex Scottish began their attack
towards "High Ground" on the 28th and were met with heavyjire andjorced to ground.
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Mqjor Telford "Si" Steele commanded "D" Company
of the Essex Scottish. Here he is being presented the
Military Cross for his exploits south of Caen at Tillyla-Campagne in July 1944 by Field Marshal B.L.
Montgomery.
(Photo courtesy ojT.E. "Si" Steele)

concentration requested by the Royals to support
their assault would have changed the end result.
But these shoots were not made due to the
unknown location of the South Saskatchewan
Regiment working down from the north. Some
success was achieved and with two companies
reaching the line of the most easterly rail line,
"Chalk Pits Hill" might have been within grasp.
Unfortunately, the companies became separated
in the woods and with that the loss of the
battalion's momentum meant a stop to the
attack.

holding up the line of advance on the right flank.
At the same time the Essex Scots were to "punch"
through on the right just north of Port du Gravier.
Final objectives for the day were "Maisie" and
"High Ground" for the two battalions respectively,
with the RRC to consolidate "Chalk Pits Hill"
with their "C" Company enroute to "Maisie."
On 28 August all major 4th and 6th Brigade
attacks were broken up by the intensity of enemy
defensive fire and our difficulties with the terrain.
The topography was most favourable to the
defence of the isthmus and the enemy took full
advantage in the selection and placement of his
strong points, albeit his maps were far superior
to ours. It is interesting to note at this juncture
that on the morning of 28 August there was a
momentary intention to abandon the attack on
the Foret de la Londe and move the 2nd Division
across the Seine River through the Elbeuf
bridgehead. However, it was not until later in
the day that 7th Brigade of 3rd Canadian Infantry
Division could consolidate the bridgehead. So
the major thrust on a full battalion level, that of
the RRC got underway at 1130 hours on the
intermediate objective of "Chalk Pits Hill." This
ground was far less dominant than "Maisie" and
probably the heavy medium artillery

On the right flank of the RRC, the Essex Scots
again put its "C" and "D" Companies into action.
At about 1300 hours they moved through the
underpass of the railway in the north part of
Port du Gravier and upon emerging on the east
side of Port du Gravier /Moulineaux road were
met with heavy fire from MGs, light mortars and
cup-discharged grenades. It became immediately
evident to these two companies, that to come to
grips with the base of "High Ground" to
commence their assault, they would have to
negotiate a steep slope down the railway
embankment and then cross a narrow valley. It
turned out to be an insurmountable obstacle
enroute to the base of "High Ground" let alone
its summit. "C" Company was commanded by
Major Tim McCoy. He was a successful staff
officer seeking an infantry battalion posting, and
had had a few offensive encounters. "D" Company
Commander, Major Telford Steele, was the only
officer to fight his company, exactly one month
earlier (28 July) into Tilly-la-Campagne, south
of CAEN, and bring over half of it out. He was
awarded the Military Cross. But here, at this
insignificant assault in the north of a small
hamlet in the Foret de la Londe, past exploits
and the gallantry of the key leaders,
commissioned and non-commissioned officers
and a few courageous experienced men turned
out to be incapable of grappling with the
situation. Many of the men of these companies
literally slid down the embankment to the valley
floor- not to get out of it again that day, being
hemmed in by intense, accurate and sustained
MG fire. Some were forced to dig in along the
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left branch of the road for protection and until
regrouping could begin to force the main
objective. In this process Major McCoy was
wounded in the shoulder but refused to be
evacuated. Shortly afterwards one of his platoon
commanders, Lieutenant George Jones, while
rallying his men, was killed. Major Steele
estimated that close to halfofhis company were
casualties. The assault on "High Ground" ground
to a halt. After darkness "C"and "D" companies
were withdrawn to their original positions along
the river road southwest of Port du Gravier.
By late evening, it was learned the South
Sasks' assault from the la Chenaie area into the
railway triangle was stopped and the FMRs could
not disengage from the south to back-up the
South Sasks' fine effort.
During the afternoon of the 28th, the GOC
2nd Division held a conference with Brigadier
Ganong and the COs of the RHLI, RRC and the
Essex Scots. The GOC's plan was based on the
capturing of "Maisie" by the passing of one
battalion by night through the right two RRC
company positions, followed by a swing to the
southeast to take out "High Ground" holding up
the Essex Scots. During the meeting, the COs of
the RHLI and RRC expressed the opinion, with
sound reasons, that at this stage the plan was
beyond the capabilities of the battalions. They
also suggested that the enemy were actually
stronger than Intelligence had indicated and that
the ground was immensely favourable to defence.
We are not aware of Lieutenant-Colonel Bennett's
opinions as may have been expressed at this
meeting. It is obvious, however, at that moment
he did not know of the sad fate of his "C" and
"D" Companies at the underpass/embankment
conflict back in Port du Gravier. The operation
as outlined at the conference was considered
necessary. The RHLI was to make the attempt
and they moved north to their forming-up-place
south of the RRC. The operation was to
commence as soon as possible, presumably
timed for a pre-first light zero hour on the 29th.
Once again the ground hampered movement
and the RHLI made slow progress in reaching
their start-line in the morning by first light.
Although field and medium artillery was in
abundant supply, as well as artillery smoke, the
RHLI took a considerable amount of time to get
across the first railway line and move on to the

second or most easterly line. Early in the
afternoon, Battalion HQ reported that its three
forward companies had suffered heavy losses.
Two of them had been withdrawn some distance
having continually run into heavy fire from MGs
and mortars. This message concluded with,
" ... impossible to proceed with original plan and
that position must be taken from another
direction." Later the RHLI were withdrawn to
the RRC area.
On the far left 6th Brigade front, the
Camerons of Canada had withdrawn but South
Sasks were back in full fight striking again in
the railway triangle. Here again they were halted
and counterattacked. However, before they could
continue the offence, the operation was
cancelled. Even the Calgary Highlanders brought
into the picture after the Camerons' withdrawal,
received a taste of the determined enemy's
intentions up to the last few hours of fighting on
the 29th. They suffered a number of casualties
in holding a position west of Moulineaux.
On 29 August, the situation on 4th Brigade's
right flank was much more encouraging. While
it was a breakout of sorts for the Essex Scots
only, this battalion is, after all, the featured
formation of this brief narrative. Sadly, the other
battalions of 4th and 6th Brigades- the South
Sasks on the left flank and the RHLI in the centre
of the line- failed to make the same gains. By
noon our "A" and "B" Companies found the enemy
to be withdrawing (on his own bloody time) and
these companies were able to advance several
hundreds of yards over part of "High Ground"
and along the river road toward Oissel. In fact,
with the clear observation from "High Ground,"
Captain Stewart was able to give fire direction
to our artillery to engage the still escaping
Germans over the Seine River in Rouen. By the
end of the day, all battalions of the two forward
brigades were consolidating defensive positions
in preparation for a relief in the line the next
day.
We seem to have all but concluded this
narrative with very little to say about Support
Company. There is not much to narrate! The four
rifle companies had limited room in which to
manoeuvre and when they made their assaults,
the 4th Field Regiment RCA and the Toronto
Scottish- heavy mortars and MMGs- performed
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Essex Scottish Officer's Mess. Horsham
England, 1944. (LeJt to right): Jack
Burgess. Jack Haggans. Si Steele. Jock
MacLennan. Doug Mcintyre, Bruce
Macdonald, Phil Grandjean. Stew
Jones. Art Zaldon. Hut Laird. Cam
Ritchie. L. Harper. Tom Stewart.
(Photo courtesy of Mcintyre family)

a more effective task on the elevated enemy
positions. However, our 6-pounder Anti-Tank
Platoon could hardly avoid becoming involved
because of their active commander, Captain Jock
McLennan. He and his gunners were able to manhandle a few guns east of the railway
embankment on 29 August and get a few shots
off at suspected enemy held rock formations and
caves on "High Ground." They enjoyed some
success ... perhaps because the enemy was
pulling out anyway and wanted to observe the
prowess of our gunners. It was, evidently, during
one of these skirmishes on the 29th that
Lieutenant Angus Murrison, the Battalion Scout
Platoon Commander, while assaulting his
platoon with our anti-tank gun support, was
killed. He and his platoon were probably trying
to make up for lost time during the last couple
of days. Their gallant effort, within the pattern
of entire divisional operation, was to no avail.
Murrison, a promising young officer, was either
the second or the third Battalion Scout Platoon
Commander killed in action during July and
August. As for Support Company, of which I only
had the pleasure of commanding for ten days,
their record of service to the forward companies
was and continued to be unblemished. All of its
ranks were dedicated weapons specialists. It is
a distinction of sorts, that of Essex Scots officers
serving in Northwest Europe, the first and last
killed in action were members of Support
Company (Lieutenant George "Pete" Ponsford,
Anti-Tank Platoon Commander, 13 July 1944
and Captain Phillip M. Grandjean, Company
Commander, 30 April 1945 respectively). Only
in mid-August, two weeks before this battle, their
Carrier Platoon Commander, Lieutenant Jack

Stewart, Distinguished Conduct Medal, was
killed while capturing a number, of enemy MG
nests at Point 151 just north of Falaise.
Our heavy supporting arms were as usual
superb! Our 4th Field Regiment Forward
Observation Officers (FOOs) were with us from
first light on the 27 August seeking out targets
of opportunity on "High Ground." Before the day
was out, white patches began to appear in the
upper forested slopes as hundreds of 25pounder HE shells exploded, tearing trees apart
with their air-burst effect. From my personal
observations and those reported from the
German positions after the fighting, it is quite
evident that the only discomfort and/ or casualties
inflicted on the enemy in three days were inflicted
by our field arty or the Toronto Scottish heavy
mortars. Company Sergeant-Major Jim Coughlin
of "A" Company advised me on 30 August, that
the Germans on "High Ground" had carted away
all their dead and equipment but that evidence
was everywhere that shrapnel had pulverized the
ground under the trees and had also entered a
number of cave-type dug-outs. This evidence was
confirmed by blood and wrappings from shell
bandages and dressings. As we have noted above,
our field arty was also hampered by the poor
quality of our maps and also to a large extent
the pinpointing of prime targets. In one case,
our medium arty was forced to abandon
important concentrations for the RRC because
of a lack of communications between units
meaning that the exact location of the South
Sasks was unknown. However, this situation
could occur in any operation. Even though
fighter-bombers could not fly in the poor weather
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4th and 6th Brigade Casualties
Foret de Ia Londe, 27-29 August 1944
Battalion
Royal Hamilton Light Infantry
Royal Regiment of Canada
Essex Scottish Regiment
South Saskatchewan Regiment
Fusiliers Mont-Royal
Camerons of Canada
Total
of 28 and 29 August, our dear friends the arty
were always with us!
With our initial pursuit operation completed
(we had several later in the year and in 1945
but none so costly ... or so futile), we will take a
few sentences to examine some implications that
should not be buried under the last humble
infantryman's blanket with him on the banks of
the Seine.
Some factors may not have come to light
before this date. Others from a tactical and/ or
command aspect may have been studied at staff
colleges in the late 1940s or 1950s. Most have
probably been forgotten forever. However, with
the publishing of the detailed Essex Scottish
fatality list in the mid-1950s, a more thorough
research tool can be utilized by those who care.
For instance, the precise number of those killedin-action in early July at Eterville, Normandy
and wherever else through Oldenburg, Germany
in late April or early May 1945 can be readily
established. Thus within the entire pursuit
operation just completed, the Essex Scots
suffered a total of 125 casualties of which 30
were fatal. These included three officers and
seven non-commissioned officers ... a one-inthree loss and almost irreplaceable even at this
early stage of the Northwest European campaign.
A loss of 125 would not be too hard to bear in a
full-scale battalion attack. Yet in this operation,
the Essex Scots had no such opportunity. This
is not to insinuate we would come off any better
than the RHLI on 29 August or the RRC earlier.
But at least it would not appear as if our troops
were frittered away on incidental skirmishes.
At first glance, we have tended to overlook
the approach part of the pursuit operation as
perhaps some kind of an approach to the

Wounded

Killed

74
141

22
44

Total
59
118
96
185
20
99
577

Fatal Casualties
Foret de Ia Londe
27-29 August 1944
The Essex Scottish Regiment
27 August 1944
Lieutenant James 0. Coombe
Sergeant Walter Buszowski
Corporal Owen T. Wilson
Private Alfred Arsenault
Private John F. Beston
Private Gordon H. Colville
Private William L. Fish
Private James G. Hill
Private Harold R. Kalbfleisch
Private Bernard L. McFadden
Private Bruce W. Murdoch
28 August 1944
Lieutenant George H. Jones
Corporal Marvin Burke
Corporal Albert Chadwick
Corporal Ralph E. Chamberlain
Private James A. Oldman
Private Harold E. Malott
Private John E. Marvyn
Private Stanley Thorpe
Private Raymond W. White
29 August 1944
Lieutenant Angus Murrison
Sergeant Charles R. Wilson

startline. Yet eight men named earlier lost their
lives in the field and by the Essex Scots fatal!
wounded ratio, we can assume another 28 to 30
all ranks were wounded up to 26 August. The
confirmed figure for the main objective, Foret
de la Lande, 27, 28 and 29 August was 96 of
which 22 were fatal. On 27 August 11 were killed,
on 28 August nine were killed and on 29 August
two met their deaths. The six infantry battalions
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of 4th and 6th Brigades had a total three-day
casualty toll of 577 all ranks, from a brigade
commander down. See box for details.
Balancing the above losses against results
or objectives taken is a complete impossibility.
Colonel C.P. Stacey in his The Victory Campaign
sums up the matter very simply, "It is evident
that in these three days of unpleasant fighting
the 2nd Division failed to make an important
impression upon the strong enemy positions east
of the valley in the Foret de la Lande. The hardfighting Germans holding them carried out their
task of covering the river crossings at Rauen,
and withdrew only when it had been completed."
Thus, as with very few operations before this
one or after, we begin to wonder about the sudden
persistence on the part of the GOC, 2nd Division?
As early as the late afternoon of 26 August, there
is some record of indecision at 2nd Division.
There were undoubtedly options open, for
example, having 6th Brigade clear the Foret and
pass 4th and 5th Brigades to Elbeufto cross the
Seine with 3rd Division. At least there is no
indication the GOC, 2nd Canadian Corps was
pressing for a total 2nd Division involvement to
clear the Foret. Then later on the morning of the
28 August, at a time when some weight should
have been given to the horrendous results of the
RRC and South Sasks fighting in the woods
during the afternoon of 27 August, the option of
abandoning the attack on the Foret was still open
and was considered.
The "piece-meal" destruction of 4th and 6th
Brigades was to continue on through the day of
28 August, even though 3rd Division had
consolidated their bridgehead at Elbeuf and had
units opposite Oissel pushing ahead very rapidly
for Rouen. Why then did the GOCs " ... consider
it necessary that a battalion be moved around
by night (it turned out to become the RHLI's time-atbat) to make an attempt to capture "Maisie" and "High
Ground"" at an "0" Group (conference) held in
mid -afternoon of the 28th ... the attack to be in
progress most of 29 August? Was there some
kind of a fierce, rules unwritten, Patton/
Montgomery-type competition going between
divisional commanders to be the first to reach
Rouen? We were already aware of the GOC's
stubborn haughtiness and apparent disregard
for the well-being of an infantry regiment. We

will not enlarge at this time. It is hardly fair under
the circumstances.
On 30 August, Lieutenant-Colonel Bennett
reorganized the battalion on a three rifle
company basis with 85 to 90 all ranks each. Our full
strength would normally be four rifle companies
of 137 all ranks. We presume the South Sasks
and others had to make similar adjustments.
We were barely able to reform ranks after a few
reinforcements arrived into some semblance of
a first rate infantry outfit by early October for
the Breakout of Antwerp, Belgium.
By 1 September, the Essex Scots were
tumultuously welcomed back to Dieppe. One
would hardly think we had been gone for two
years and two weeks! Among a few ceremonious
events of the next few days was a battalion March
Past in honour of those survivors of the 19
August 1942 Raid still serving with the regiment.
All seven men took the salute with pride, and
perhaps a tear in their eyes. And so it goes with
an infantry regiment ... and thank heaven for
esprit de corps!

The editors of Canadian Military History would
like to thank Fran Crummer for bringing this
article to our attention, andfor her tireless efforts
to .find photos to accompany it.
Lieutenent-Colonel Doug W. Mcintyre
mobilized with the 1st Battalion. The Kent
Regiment in 1940. He later joined the Essex
Scottish Regiment in the United Kingdom and
served with that unit as a company
commander and second-in-command.
During the battle to liberate Groningen,
Holland in April 1945, Mclntrye, then
commanding "A" Company, discovered a
bridge intact over a major canal. He quickly
launched an attack with his company
mounted in Kangaroos. The bridge was
captured and greatly facilitated the liberation
of the town.
He was awarded the
Distinguished Service Order for his actions.
Following the war, Mclntrye rejoined the
Kents and served as their commanding officer
from 1951 to 1954 when the regiment was
amalgamated with the Essex Scottish to form
the Essex and Scottish Kent. Doug Mcintrye
passed away in 1981.
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